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Abstract
In many real-world matching applications, there are restrictions for institutions either on
priorities of their slots or on the transferability of unfilled slots over others (or both). Motivated
by the need in such real-life matching problems, this paper formulates a family of practical
choice rules, slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers (SSPwCT). These practical rules
invoke both slot-specific priorities structure and transferability of vacant slots. We show that
the cumulative offer mechanism (COM) is stable, strategy-proof and respects improvements with
regards to SSPwCT choice rules. Transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, while all
else is constant, leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. Following Kominer’s
(2020) formulation, we also provide comparative static results for expansion of branch capacity
and addition of new contracts in the SSPwCT framework. Our results have implications for
resource allocation problems with diversity considerations.
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1 Introduction
The slot-specific priorities framework of Kominers and Sönmez (2016) is an influential many-to-one
matching model with contracts. Each contract is between an agent and an institution, and specifies
some terms and conditions. Slots have their own (potentially independent) rankings for contracts.
Within each institution, a linear order – referred to as the precedence order – determines the se-
quence in which slots are filled. This framework provides a powerful tool for market designers and
policymakers to handle diversity and affirmative action. Institutions choose contracts by filling their
slots sequentially. An agent might have different priority at different slots of the same institution .
In the context of cadet-branch matching (Switzer and Sönmez, 2013 and Sönmez, 2013), for example,
some slots for each service branch grant higher priority for cadets who are willing to serve additional
years of service. Kominers and Sönmez (2016) develop a general framework to handle these types
of slot-specific priority structures. The slot-specific priorities framework embeds the settings of the
following works among others: Balinski and Sönmez (1999), Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003),
Kojima (2012), Hafalir et al. (2013), and Aygün and Bó (2020), Switzer and Sönmez (2013), and
Sönmez (2013).
The slot-specific priorities offer flexible solutions to important real-world matching problems.
Aygün and Bó (2020), for example, design slot-specific priorities choice rules for the Brazilian col-
lege admission problem, where students have multidimensional privileges. In 2012 Brazilian public
universities were mandated to use affirmative action policies for candidates from racial and income
minorities. The law established that certain fractions of the accepted students in each program
should have studied in public high schools, come from a low-income family, and/or belong to racial
minorities. This objective was implemented by partitioning the positions in each program, earmark-
ing them for different combinations of these affirmative action characteristics. Aygün and Bó (2020)
analyze several of these choice rules, present their shortcomings and correct their shortcomings by
designing slot-specific priorities choice rules for programs.
More recently, Pathak et al. (2020a) invoke the slot-specific priorities framework to design triage
protocol for ventilator rationing.1 The authors analyze the consequences of using a reserve system—
in which ventilators are partitioned into multiple categories—for rationing medical resources. The
authors propose sequential reserve matching rules, which are first introduced in the slot-specific
framework of Kominers and Sönmez (2016).
When slot priorities are restricted due to institutional constraints, the full potential of the slot-
specific priorities framework might not be achieved. Another useful tool that allows interactions
across slots is capacity transfers —introduced by Westkamp (2013). Capacity transfers allow more
general forms of interactions across slots than slot specific priorities do. However, Westkamp (2013)
does not allow the variation in contractual terms. For applications such as cadet-branch matching
(Switzer and Sönmez, 2013 and Sönmez, 2013), airline upgrade allocation (Kominers and Sönmez,
2016), and admissions for publicly funded educational institutions and government-sponsored jobs
1The most recent version of Pathak et al. (2020a) considers more general framwork. See Pathak et al. (2020b).
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in India (Aygün and Turhan, 2017, 2020a, 2020b), allowing the variation in contractual terms is
necessary.
In many real-world applications, either slot priorities (for some slots if not all) or the ability to
transfer vacant slots may be restricted due to institutional constraints especially in diversity and
affirmative action in school choice, college admissions, government-sponsored job matching, and also
faculty hiring. When both are restricted, some slots might remain unfilled. This, in turn, might lead
to a Pareto inferior outcome. A real-world example of this case can be seen in India. For admissions
to publicly funded educational institutions and government-sponsored jobs in India, each institution
reserves 15 percent of its slots for people from Scheduled Castes (SC), 7.5 percent for people from
Scheduled Tribes (ST), and 27 percent for people from Other Backward Classes (OBC). People
who do not belong to any of these categories are referred to as members of the General Category
(GC). The remaining slots are called open-category slots and are available to everyone, including
those from SC, ST, and OBC. In each institution, for slots that are reserved for SC, ST and OBC,
only applicants who declare they belong to these respective categories are considered. If there is
low demand from either SC or ST applicants, some slots remain vacant. Vacant SC/ST slots can
potentially be utilized by two ways: (1) other candidates can be made eligible for SC/ST slots, but
at a lower priority than all SC/ST applicants, or (2) vacant SC/ST slots can be reverted into, say,
open-category slots. Currently, none of these possibilities are allowed. Each year many SC/ST slots
remain vacant.
There are instances where slot priorities are restricted but transferability is allowed. Baswana
et al. (2018) designed and implemented a new joint seat allocation process for technical universities
in India. Since 2008, following a Supreme Court decision, unfilled OBC slots are required to be
made available to GC candidates of publicly funded educational institutions. However, institutions
are prohibited from modifying the priorities of OBC slots. This possibility was offered to Indian
authorities but ultimately rejected. On the other hand, reverting vacant OBC slots into GC slots
is allowed. Baswana et al. (2018) report their interaction with the Indian policy makers as follows:
“Business rule 5 required unfilled OBC seats to be made available to Open category can-
didates. The approach we initially suggested involved construction of augmented Merit
Lists making Open category candidates eligible for OBC seats but at a lower priority than
all OBC candidates, and modification of virtual preference lists so that general candi-
dates now apply for both the OPEN and the OBC virtual programs. We showed that
running our algorithm on these modified inputs would produce the candidate optimal al-
location satisfying the business rules. However, the authorities feared that this approach
may cause issues with computing the closing rank correctly (see Design Insight 6), or
have some other hidden problem. An authority running centralized college or school
admissions is typically loathe to modify, add complexity to, or replace software that is
tried and tested.”
In this paper, we invoke both of these powerful tools –i.e., capacity transfers across slots and inde-
pendent slot priorities– to formulate a larger set of practical choice rules. Our aim is to expand the
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toolkit of market designers to be able to implement comprehensive selection criteria, especially when
there are institutional restrictions. We construct institutional choices as follows: Each institution
has two types of slots: original slots and shadow slots. Each shadow slot has an initial capacity of
0 and is associated with an original slot. Each slot (original and shadow) has a linear order (po-
tentially independent) over contracts. Institutions have precedence orders over original and shadow
slots. Each institution is also endowed with a location vector for shadow slots. The exact order
at which slots are processed is determined by the precedence orders over original and shadow slots
together with the location vector. The interaction between associated original and shadow slots is
as follows: If an original slot is assigned a contract, then the capacity of the associated shadow slot
remains 0, i.e., the shadow slot will be inactive. If an original slot cannot be filled, the institution
has the option to transfer its capacity to the associated shadow slot. In this case, the capacity of the
shadow slot becomes 1. A capacity transfer vector of the institution determines for which original
slots such reversion is allowed and for which ones it is not.
When the transferability of all original slots is prohibited, our model reduces to that of Kominers
and Sönmez (2016). Given the exact precedence order (i.e., precedence orders over original and
shadow slots, location vector of shadow slots), capacity transfer vector, and slot priorities over
contracts, slots are filled sequentially in a straightforward manner. We call this family of choice
rules that are constructed this way Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers Choice Rules
(SSPwCT). We show how markets with SSPwCT choice rules can be cleared by the COM. To do
so, we borrowed the hidden substitutes theory of Hatfield and Kominers (2019). The COM is the
unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism in the SSPwCT environment (Theorem 1) that also
respects improvements (Theorem 2).
Finally, we provide several comparative static regarding the outcome of the COM with respect
to SSPwCT choice rules. We first show that when an institution reverts one more original slot
into a shadow slot in the case of a vacancy, if all else is fixed, we obtain a strategy-proof Pareto
improvement under the COM (Theorem 3). Then, building on Kominers’ (2020) analysis, we show
that the outcome of the COM is (weakly) improved for all agents when (1) an original slot is added
to an institution, while all else remains fixed (Theorem 4), (2) new contracts are added at the bottom
of slots’ priority orders right before the null contract (Theorem 5), and (3) the new contracts of a
single agent are added anywhere in the slots’ priority orders (Theorem 6).
SSPwCT choice rules may be used in cadet-branch matching in USMA and ROTC (Sönmez
and Switzer, 2013 and Sönmez, 2013), resource allocation in India with comprehensive affirmative
action (Boswana et al., 2019, Aygün and Turhan, 2020a and 2020b), Chilean school choice and
college admissions with affirmative action (Rios et al., 2018 and Correa et al., 2019 ) , and Brazilian
college admissions with multidimensional reserves (Aygün and Bó, 2020).
Related Literature
Our model is built on that of Kominers and Sönmez (2016). The SSPwCT choice rules expands
the slot-specific priorities choice rules of Kominers and Sönmez (2016) by allowing transferability
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of vacant slots. When transferability is not allowed, the SSPwCT choice rules are equivalent to the
slot-specific priorities choice rules. As opposed to Kominers and Sönmez (2016), in the presence
of capacity transfers, it is not possible to define associated one-to-one model of agent-slot market
in our setting. We instead invoke Hatfield and Kominers’ (2019) hidden substitutes theory to show
that the COM with respect to SSPwCT choice rules is stable and strategy-proof.
Recently, Aygün and Turhan (2020) show that each slot-specific priorities choice rule can be
written as a dynamic reserves choice rule. The family of SSPwCT choice rules embeds Aygün
and Turhan’s (2020) dynamic reserves choice rules family. There are two important advantages
of the SSPwCT rules over the dynamic reserves choice rules. The first one is that the SSPwCT
functions are simpler to describe. The capacity functions in the setting of dynamic reserves are
complicated, whereas transfer functions in the SSPwCT environment is just a vector of binary
variables. The second one is that in the dynamic reserves setting there is a master priority ordering
for each institution, and the priority orderings of different groups of slots within the institution are
obtained from the master priority ordering in a straightforward manner by removing some agents.
In the current paper, following the model of Kominers and Sönmez (2016), slots have more general
priorities (possibly independent) over contracts.
Kominers (2020) gives a novel proof of the entry comparative static via the respecting improve-
ment property, and also shows that his proof extends to yield comparative static results in matching
with slot-specific priorities framework. By adapting his notation and formulation, we further extend
his results to the SSPwCT environment. Papers that study entry comparative static include Kelso
and Crawford (1982), Gale and Sotomayor (1985), Crawford (1991), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005),
Biró et al. (2008), Ostrovsky (2008), and Chambers and Yenmez (2017), among others.
Our paper uses the matching with contracts framework that is introduced by Fleiner (2003)
and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). Important work on matching with contracts, among many oth-
ers, include Hatfield and Kojima (2010), Aygün and Sönmez (2013), Afacan (2017), Hatfield and
Kominers (2019), and Hatfield et al. (2017, 2019).
We study a family of lexicographic choice rules with transfers. Lexicographic choice rules (with-
out transfers) are recently studied in Chambers and Yenmez (2018) and Doğan et al. (2018), among
others.
Finally, our paper also contributes the matching literature on distributional constraints. There
is extensive literature on this line of literature. A partial list includes Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez
(2003), Abdulkadiroğlu (2005), Biró et al. (2010), Kojima (2012), Hafalır et al. (2013), Westkamp
(2013), Echenique and Yenmez (2015), Kamada and Kojima (2015, 2017, and 2018), Fragiadakis
and Troyan (2017), Aygün and Turhan (2017, 2020a, 2020b), Jagadeesan (2019), Nguyen and Vohra
(2019), Afacan (2020), and Dur et al. (2020).
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2 Matching with Contracts Framework
There is a finite set of agents I = {i1, ..., in} and a finite set of branches B = {b1, ..., bm}. There
is a finite set of contracts X . Each contract x ∈ X is associated with an agent i(x) and a branch
b(x). There may be many contracts for each agent-branch pair. We call a set of contracts X ⊆ X
an outcome, with i(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{i(x)} and b(X) ≡ ∪
x∈X
{b(x)}. For any i ∈ I , we let Xi ≡ {x ∈ X |
i(x) = i}. Similarly, for any b ∈ B, we let Xb ≡ {x ∈ X | b(x) = b}.
Each agent i ∈ I has unit demand over contracts in Xi ≡ {x ∈ X | i(x) = i} and an outside
option ∅i. The strict preference of agent i over Xi ∪ {∅i} is denoted by Pi. A contract x ∈ Xi is
acceptable for i (with respect to Pi) if xPi∅i. Agent preferences over contracts are naturally extended
to preferences over outcomes. For each individual i ∈ I and set of contracts X ⊆ X , we denote by
max
Pi
X the maximal element of X according to preference order Pi, and we assume that max
Pi
X = ∅
if ∅iPix for all x ∈ X. Each individual always chooses the best available contract according to his
preferences, so that choice rule Ci(X) of an individual i ∈ I from contract set X ⊆ X is defined by
Ci(X) = max
Pi
X.
Each branch b ∈ B, on the other hand, has multi-unit demand and is endowed with a choice
rule Cb. We let qb denote the capacity of branch b. The choice rule Cb describes how branch b
would choose from any offered set of contracts. We assume throughout that for all X ⊆ X and
for all b ∈ B, the choice rule Cb satisfies (1) Cb(X) ⊆ Xb, and (2) Cb(X) is feasible in the sense
that it contains at most one contract of any given agent. For any X ⊆ X and b ∈ B, we denote by
Rb(X) ≡ X \ Cb(X) the set of contracts that b rejects from X.
A set of contracts X ⊆ X is a feasible outcome if | Xi |≤ 1, for every i ∈ I , and | Xb |≤ qb, for
each b ∈ B.
A feasible outcome X ⊆ X is stable if
1. Ci(X) = Xi for all i ∈ I , and Cb(X) = Xb, for all b ∈ B, and
2. there is no b ∈ B and set of contracts Y 6= Cb(X) such that Yb = Cb(X∪Y ) and Yi = Ci(X∪Y )
for all i ∈ i(Y ).
The first condition is known as individual rationality and requires that no agent or branch would
rather drop one of the signed contracts. The second condition is the no blocking requirement. If
fails, then there is an alternative set of contracts that a branch and agents associated with a contract
in that set strictly prefers.
2.1 Slot-specific Priorities with Capacity Transfers (SSPwCT) Choice Rules
Each branch b ∈ B has two types of seats: original seats and shadow seats. Let Ob = {o1b , o
2
b , ..., o
nb
b }
and Eb = {e1b , e
2
b , ..., e
nb
b } be branch b’s set of original seats and shadow seats, respectively, where
nb denotes the physical capacity of branch b. Each seat in both Ob and Eb has priority orders over
contracts in Xb∪{∅} denoted by Πob for o ∈ Os and Π
e
b for e ∈ Es (the weak orders are denoted by Γ
o
and Γe) and can be assigned at most one contract in Xb ≡ {x ∈ X | b(x) = b}. Let Πb = (Πob ,Π
e
b)
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denote the priority profile of branch b and Π = (Πb)b∈B denote the priority profiles of all branches.
We denote by max
pio
X the maximal element of X according to priority ordering Πo and by max
pie
X
the maximal element of X according to priority ordering Πe. We assume max
pio
X = ∅ if ∅Πox for all
x ∈ X and max
pie
X = ∅ if ∅Πex for all x ∈ X.
Each branch b ∈ B has two linear precedence orders, one over original seats, ⊲Ob , and one
over shadow seats, ⊲Eb . We denote Ob = {o
1
b , o
2
b ..., o
nb
b } with o
l
b ⊲
O
b o
l+1
b and Eb = {e
1
b , e
2
b ..., e
nb
b } with
elb⊲
E
b e
l+1
b unless otherwise stated. The interpretation of ⊲
O
b is that if o⊲
O
b o
′, then, whenever possible,
branch b fills seat o before o
′
. Each shadow seat is associated with an original seat. If the original
seat remains empty, then branch b can decide whether to transfer its capacity to its associated
shadow seat, which initially has no capacity, through a capacity transfer scheme qb defined below.
A capacity transfer scheme is an integer-valued vector qb = (q1b , q
2
b , ..., q
nb
b ) such that for every
k = 1, ..., nb:
qkb =


0 if branch b does not transfer capacity from okb to e
k
b when o
k
b is not filled.
1 if branch b transfers capacity from okb to e
k
b when o
k
b is not filled.
Since a capacity transfer from okb to e
k
b is possible only when o
k
b is not filled, the physical capacity
of branch b is never violated. We define an indicator function for the original seats as follows:
1ol
b
=


0 if seat olb remains empty.
1 if seat olb is filled.
Given precedence orders ⊲Ob and ⊲
E
b
, a location vector for the shadow seats of branch b is an
integer-valued vector Lb = (l1, ..., lnb) where lk is the number of original seats that precede shadow
seat ekb that satisfy the following condition:
Lb = {(l1, ..., lnb) | k ≤ lk ≤ nb ∀k = 1, ..., nb and lk ≥ lk−1 ∀k = 2, ..., nb}.
The condition in the definition of Lb ensures that for every shadow seat, the number of preceding
original seats is greater than the number of preceding shadow seats. Hence, a shadow seat will
never come before its associated original seat in this order. The location vector Lb together with
precedence orders ⊲Ob and ⊲
E
b gives us the exact order in which the original and shadow seats are
filled. Let ⊲b ≡ (⊲Ob , ⊲
E
b , Lb) denote the exact order of branch b’s slots. We illustrate this with an
example below.
Example 1. Consider a branch with three original seats with o1b ⊲
O
b o
2
b ⊲
O
b o
3
b and three shadow
seats with e1b ⊲
E
b e
2
b ⊲
E
b e
3
b together with the location vector Lb = (1, 3, 3). The order ⊲b in which the
original and shadow seats are filled is as follows:
o1b e
1
b o
2
b o
3
b e
2
b e
3
b
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Description of SSPwCT Choice Rules
For branch b ∈ B, Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) : 2X → 2X denotes the choice rule of branch b given the precedence
order of slots ⊲b, the capacity transfer function qb, and the priority profile of slots Πb. Given a set
of contracts X ⊆ X , Cb(X, ⊲b, qb,Πb) denotes the set of chosen contracts for branch b from the set
of contracts X.
To formulate the choice rule, we first rename the slots as S = (s1, s2, ..., s2nb) where sk is either
an original or a shadow seat, depending on ⊲Ob , ⊲
E
b
, and Lb. In Example 1 above with Lb = (1, 3, 3),
we can rename slots as follows: s1b = o
1
b , s
2
b = e
1
b ,s
3
b = o
2
b , s
4
b = o
3
b , s
5
b = e
2
b , and s
6
b = e
3
b . It is
important to note that Π
s1
b
b = Π
o1
b
b , Π
s2
b
b = Π
e1
b
b , etc...
We are now ready to describe the choice procedure. Given X ⊆ X :
• Start with the original seat s1b . Assign the contract x
1 that is Π
s1
b
b − maximal among the
contracts in X.
• If s2b is either an original or a shadow seat such that 1o1b = 0 and q
1
b = 1, assign the contract
x2 that is Π
s2
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X \Xi({x1}). Otherwise, assign the empty
set.
• This process continues in sequence. If skb is an original seat or a shadow seat such that 1orb = 0,
where orb is the original seat that is associated with the shadow seat s
k
b , and q
r
b = 1, then assign
contract xk that is Π
sk
b
b − maximal among the contracts in X \ Xi({x1,...,xk−1}). Otherwise,
assign the empty set.
Given nb, (⊲b, qb,Πb) parametrizes the family of SSPwCT choice rules for branch b.
Examples of SSPwCT Choice Rules
Example 2. Consider b ∈ B with nb = 3, Lb = (1, 2, 3), and qb = (1, 1, 1). The capacity transfer
scheme allows branch b to transfer capacities from original seats to shadow seats whenever they
remain unfilled. Given the location vector and capacity transfer scheme, the choice procedure for
branch b is as follows. Given an offer set X ⊆ X :
• Assign o1b the contract x
1 that is Π
o1
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X.
• If 1o1
b
= 0, assign e1b the contract x
2 that is Π
e1
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X \Xi({x1}).
Otherwise, assign e1b the empty set.
• Assign o2b the contract x
3 that is Π
o2
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X \Xi({x1,x2}).
• If 1o2
b
= 0, assign e2b the contract x
4 that is Π
e2
b
b − maximal among the contracts in X \
Xi({x1,x2,x3}). Otherwise, assign e
2
b the empty set.
• Assign o3b the contract x
5 that is Π
o3
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X \Xi({x1,x2,x3,x4}).
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• If 1o3
b
= 0, assign e3b the contract x
6 that is Π
e3
b
b − maximal among the contracts in X \
Xi({x1,x2,x3,x4,x5}). Otherwise, assign e
3
b the empty set.
The following picture depicts the order of slots and the capacity transfer scheme where arrows
indicate that the capacity is transferred if the original seat remains empty:
o1b e
1
b o
2
b e
2
b o
3
b e
3
b
In the previous example each shadow seat appears right after its corresponding original seat. It
is common in practice for the institution to try to fill its original seats first before the shadow seats.
We provide such an example below.
Example 3. Consider branch b ∈ B with nb = 3, Lb = (3, 3, 3), and qb = (1, 1, 1). The following
picture depicts the order of slots and the capacity transfer scheme where arrows indicate that the
capacity is transferred if the original seat remains empty:
o1b o
2
b o
3
b e
1
b e
2
b e
3
b
Note that for any location vector, if the capacity transfer scheme is a vector of zeros, the SSPwCT
choice rules are equivalent to the slot-specific priorities choice rules in Kominers and Sönmez (2016).
Substitutable Completion of SSPwCT Choice Rules
A choice function Cb satisfies the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition if for all
Y ⊂ X, for all z ∈ X \ Y , and z /∈ Cb (Y ∪ {z}) implies Cb (Y ) = Cb (Y ∪ {z}). A choice
function Cb satisfies substitutability if for all z, z′ ∈ X, and Y ⊆ X, z /∈ Cb (Y ∪ {z}) =⇒
z /∈ Cb (Y ∪ {z, z′}). A choice function Cb satisfies the law of aggregate demand (LAD) if
Y ⊆ Y ′ =⇒| Cb (Y ) | ≤ | Cb (Y ′) |.
The following definitions are from Hatfield and Kominers (2019):
A completion of a choice function Cb of branch b ∈ B is a choice function C
b
, such
that for all X ⊆ X , either C
b
(X) = Cb(X) or there exists a distinct x, x
′
∈ C
b
(X)
such that i(x) = i(x
′
). If a choice function Cb has a completion that satisfies the
substitutability and IRC condition, then Cb is said to be substitutably completable.
If every choice function in a profile C = (Cb)b∈B is substitutably completable, then we
say that C is substitutably completable.
Given the precedence order of slots ⊲b, the capacity transfer function qb, and the priority profile of
slots Πb, and a set of contracts X ⊆ X , we define a related choice procedure C
b
. To formulate this
related choice rule, we first rename the slots as S = (s1, s2, ..., s2nb) where sk is either an original
or a shadow seat, depending on ⊲Ob , ⊲
E
b
, and Lb.
9
• Start with the original seat s1b . Assign the contract x
1 that is Π
s1
b
b − maximal among the
contracts in X.
• If s2b is either an original or a shadow seat such that 1o1b = 0 and q
1
b = 1, assign the contract
x2 that is Π
s2
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X \ {x
1}. Otherwise, assign the empty set.
• This process continues in sequence. If skb is an original seat or a shadow seat such that 1orb = 0,
where orb is the original seat that is associated with the shadow seat s
k
b , and q
r
b = 1, then assign
contract xk that is Π
sk
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X\{x
1, ..., xk−1}. Otherwise, assign
the empty set.
The difference between the SSPwCT choice rule Cb we defined in the main text and C
b
defined
above is as follows: In the computation of Cb, if a contract of an agent is chosen by some slot, then
her other remaining contracts are removed for the rest of the choice procedure. On the other hand,
in the computation of C
b
, if a contract of an agent is chosen by a slot, then her other contracts will
still be available for the following slots.
The following proposition shows that C
b
defined above is the completion of the SSPwCT choice
rule Cb.
Proposition 1. C
b
is a completion of Cb.
Our next results shows that C
b
satisfies the IRC condition, the substitutability and the LAD.
Proposition 2. C
b
is substitutable, satisfies the IRC condition, and the LAD.
2.2 Cumulative Offer Mechanism
A mechanism Ψ(·, C), where C = (Cb)b∈B is a given profile of choice rules for branches, is a mapping
from preference profiles of agents P = (Pi)i∈I to outcomes. A mechanism Ψ(·, C) is stable if Ψ(P,C)
is a stable outcome for every preference profile P . A mechanism Ψ(·, C) is strategy-proof if for every
preference profile P , and for each individual i ∈ I , there is no reported preference P˜i, such that
Ψ((P˜i, P−i), C)PiΨ(P,C).
We now introduce the cumulative offer mechanism (COM), whose outcome is found with the
following cumulative offer algorithm:
Step 1. An arbitrarily chosen agent propose her first choice contract x1. The branch b(x1) holds
the contract x1 if Cb(x1) ({x1}) = {x1}, and rejects it otherwise. Let A1b(x1) = {x1}, and A
1
b = ∅ for
all b ∈ B \ {b(x1)}.
In general,
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Step t. An arbitrarily chosen agent, for whom no branch currently holds a contract, proposes
her favorite contract, call it xt, among the ones that have not been rejected in the previous steps.
The branch b(xt) holds xt if xt ∈ Cb(xt)
(
At−1
b(xt)
∪ {xt}
)
and rejects it otherwise. Let At
b(xt)
=
At−1
b(xt)
∪ {xt}, and Atb = A
t−1
b for all b ∈ B \ {b(xt)}.
This algorithm terminates when every agent is matched to a branch or every unmatched agent
has all acceptable contracts rejected. Since there are finitely many contracts, the algorithm termi-
nates in some finite step T . The final outcome is ∪
b∈B
Cb
(
ATb
)
.
Theorem 1. The COM with respect to SSPwCT choice rules is stable and strategy-proof.
3 Respecting Improvements
Respect for improvements is an intuitive and desirable property in practice. It suggest that agents
should have no incentive to try to lower their standings in branches’ priority orders. This natural
property becomes crucial, especially in merit-based systems where branches’ priority orderings are
determined through exam scores. To formally define it in our framework, fix the precedence order
⊲b ≡ (⊲
O
b , ⊲
E
b , Lb) and the capacity transfer function qb of branch b.
Definition 1. We say that a choice rule Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) of branch b is an improvement over
Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) for agent i ∈ I if for all slots s ∈ Ob ∪ Eb the following conditions hold:
1. for all x ∈ Xi and y ∈
(
XI\{i} ∪ {∅}
)
, if xΠsby then xΠ
s
by; and
2. for all y, z ∈ XI\{i}, yΠ
s
bz if and only if yΠ
s
bz.
That is, Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) is an improvement over Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) for agent i if Πb is obtained from
Πb by increasing the priority of some of i’s contracts while leaving the relative priority of other
agents’ contracts unchanged. We say that a profile of branch choices C ≡ (Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb))b∈B
is an improvement over C ≡ (Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb))b∈B for agent i ∈ I if, for each branch b ∈ B,
Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) is an improvement over the choice rule Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb).
We say that a mechanism ϕ respects improvements for i ∈ I if for any preference profile
P ∈ ×i∈IP
i
ϕi(P ;C)R
iϕi(P ;C)
whenever C ≡ (Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb))b∈B is an improvement over C ≡ (Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb))b∈B .
Theorem 2. The COM with respect to SSPwCT choice rules respects improvements.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we first look at the effect of increasing the transferability of original seats on agents’
welfare under the COM with respect to SSPwCT choice rules. We, then, extend the comparative
static results of Kominers (2020) to the SSPwCT family. Kominers (2020) provides a new proof
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of the entry comparative static, by way of the respect for improvements property. The author
sheds light on a strong relationship between several different entry comparative statics and the
respecting improvement property in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Building on his
formulation, we analyze the effect of expanding the capacity of a single branch on agents’ welfare
agent-proposing under the COM in SSPwCT environment. We also examine the effect of adding
contracts on agents’ welfare under the COM in our setting.
4.1 Increasing Transferability
SSPwCT is a large family of choice rules. If transferability of all original slots is prohibited, we obtain
the slot-specific priorities choice rules of Kominers and Sönmez (2016). Allowing transferability of
an original slot, while everything else remains fixed, is welfare-improving for agents. We analyze
the monotonicity of improvements on agents’ welfare by only changing the transferability of original
slots, while all else remains fixed.
Let q˜b and qb be two capacity transfer schemes for branch b. We say that q˜b is more flexible
than qb if q˜b > qb, i.e., q˜kb ≥ q
k
b for all k = 1, ..., nb and q˜
l
b > q
l
b for some l = 1, ..., nb. Suppose
that ⊲b and Πb are fixed. Then, the SSPwCT choice rule Cb(·, ⊲b, q˜b,Πb) can be interpreted as an
expansion of the SSPwCT choice rule Cb(·, ⊲b, qb,Πb) if q˜b is more flexible than qb. We are now
ready to present our result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Z is the outcome of the COM at (P,C), where P = (Pi1 , ..., Pin ) is the
profile of agent preferences and C = (Cb1 , ..., Cbm) is the profile of branches’ SSPwCT choice rules.
Fix a branch b ∈ B. Suppose that C˜b takes as an input capacity transfer scheme that is more flexible
than that of Cb, holding all else constant. Then, the outcome of the COM at (P, (C˜b, C−b)), Z˜,
Pareto dominates Z.
Theorem 3 is intuitive and indicates that making an untransferable original slot of a branch
transferable leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. One should note that ex-
panding a branch’s choice rule changes the stability definition. However, Theorem 3 provides a
normative foundation for such a change, as it increases agents’ welfare.2
4.2 Expanding Capacity
We follow the formulation of Kominers (2020) in this section. We look at how the COM outcome
changes when an original slot is added to branch b in the SSPwCT environment. Suppose the choice
rules of all branches other than b are fixed. We extend the set of original slots in branch b from Ob
to O˜b = Ob ∪ {o˜}, where o˜ is the newly added original slot. We assume there is no change in the
priorities of slots in Ob. We write Π˜b = (Πb, πo˜), where Πb = (Πob ,Π
e
b) is the priority profile of slots
in Ob ∪ Eb and πo˜ is the priority ordering of new original slot o˜.
2This result does not contradict the findings of Alva and Manjunath (2019), because transferring the capacity of
an original slot to an associated shadow slot changes the feasible set in their context.
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As pointed out by Kominers (2020), adding a new original slot o˜ is similar to boosting the
ranking of contracts of all agents that were deemed unacceptable in πo˜, keeping constant all other
slots’ rankings. Hence, by our Theorem 2, adding o˜ leads to an improvement for all agents. We
state this result formally as follows:
Theorem 4. Let Z and Z˜ be the outcomes of the COM in the markets with the set of slots {Ob ∪
Eb}b∈B and {Ob ∪Eb}b∈B ∪ {o˜b}, respectively, where o˜b is an original slot added to branch b. Then,
each agent i ∈ I (weakly) prefers her assignment under Z˜ to her assignment under Z.
This result expands Theorem 2 of Kominers (2020) to the SSPwCT family. Our Theorems 3
and 4 together imply the following: if a new original slot and its associated shadow slot are added
and transferability is allowed, then the COM outcome is improved for agents.
4.3 Adding Contracts
Kominers (2020) also shows that adding new contracts at the bottom of some slots’ priority orders
(that is, right before the null contract ∅) improves outcomes for all agents. We follow his terminology
to extend his result to the SSPwCT family. The following formulation is adapted to the SSPwCT
environment from Kominers (2020): Let X be an initial set of contracts and X˜ is a newly added
set of contracts, expanding the set to X ∪ X˜. Let P˜ = (P˜i)i∈I and Π˜ = (Π˜b)b∈B denote the vector
of agent preferences and slot priorities over X ∪ X˜, respectively. Suppose that (1) xP˜ix
′
if and only
if xPix
′
for all i ∈ I and (2) x, x
′
∈ X, and xΠ˜sbx
′
if and only if xΠsbx
′
for all slots s ∈ {Ob ∪Eb}b∈B
and x, x
′
∈ X. If xΠ˜sbx˜ for all slots s ∈ {Ob ∪Eb}b∈B, x ∈ X, and x˜ ∈ X˜, then Π˜ is an improvement
over Π under X ∪ X˜. Each slot s ∈ {Ob ∪ Eb}b∈B deems all the contracts in X˜ as unacceptable in
Πsb. Hence, Π˜ can be obtained from Π by improving the ranking of contracts in X˜ above the outside
option. Then, our Theorem 2 implies the following result.
Theorem 5. Let Z and Z˜ be the outcomes of the COM in the markets with the set of contracts X
and X ∪ X˜, respectively. Then, each agent i ∈ I (weakly) prefers her assignment under Z˜ to her
assignment under Z.
Our Theorem 5 expands Theorem 3 of Kominers (2020) to the SSPwCT family.
In our final comparative static, we show that an agent receives a (weakly) better outcome in
the COM when new contracts are added for this agent. The following formulation is adapted to
the SSPwCT environment from Kominers (2020): Let x˜ be a new contract that is added to the
contract set X, expanding it to X ∪ {x˜}. Let P˜ = (P˜i)i∈I and Π˜ = (Π˜b)b∈B denote the vector of
agent preferences and slot priorities over X ∪ {x˜}, respectively. Suppose (1) xP˜ix
′
if and only if
xPix
′
for all i ∈ I and x, x
′
∈ X, and (2) xΠ˜sbx
′
if and only if xΠsbx
′
for all slots s ∈ {Ob ∪ Eb}b∈B
and x, x
′
∈ X. Then, our Theorem 2 implies the following result.
Theorem 6. Let Z and Z˜ be the outcomes of the COM in the market with the set of contracts X
and X ∪ {x˜}, respectively. Then, each agent i(x˜) (weakly) prefers her assignment under Z˜ to her
assignment under Z.
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This result expands Theorem 4 of Kominers (2020) to the SSPwCT family.
5 Conclusions
This paper introduces a practical family of SSPwCT choice rules. We show that when these choice
rules are used by institutions the COM is stable, strategy-proof, and respects improvements. More-
over, we show that transferring the capacity of one more unfilled slot, if all else remains constant,
leads to strategy-proof Pareto improvement of the COM. We also show that both expansion of
branch capacities and adding new contracts (weakly) increase agents’ welfare under the COM.
The SSPwCT choice rules expands the toolkit available to market designers and may be used in
real-world matching markets to accommodate diversity concerns. We believe SSPwCT choice rules
may be invoked in cadet-branch matching in USMA and ROTC, resource allocation problems in In-
dia with comprehensive affirmative action, Chilean school choice with affirmative action constraints,
and Brazilian college admissions with multidimensional reserves, among many others.
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Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1. Let ⊲b the precedence order of slots, qb be the capacity transfer function,
and Πb be the priority profile of slots. Consider an offer set X ⊆ X . If there are distinct x, x
′
∈
C
b
(X) such that i(x) = i(x
′
), then we are done. Now, suppose that there is no pair of contracts
x, x
′
∈ C
b
(X) such that i(x) = i(x
′
). We need to show that Cb (X) = C
b
(X) in this case.
We prove our claim by induction on slots’ indexes k = 1, ..., 2nb. We show that for each slot
the contracts chosen by Cb and C
b
is the same. For the first slot, s1b , both C
b and C
b
chooses the
Π
s1
b
b −maximal among the contracts in X. By way of induction, assume that each of the first k− 1
slots, s1b , ..., s
k−1
b , selects the same contract under choice procedures C
b and C
b
, respectively. Call
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these contracts x1, ..., xk−1, with the possibility that some of xjs, j = 1, ...., k − 1, might be the
null contract ∅. We need to show that the kth slot skb , selects the same contract under C
b and C
b
,
respectively. Let xk be the contract Cb selects at slot k among the contracts in X \Xi({x1,...,xk−1}).
That is, xk is the Π
sk
b
b −maximal contract among contracts in X \Xi({x1,...,xk−1}). Under C
b
, slot skb
selects Π
sk
b
b −maximal contract among X \{x
1, ..., xk−1}. Since Π
sk
b
b is a linear order and no contract
of agents i
({
x1, ..., xk−1
})
is chosen at any other slot by our initial supposition, Π
sk
b
b −maximal
contract among the contracts in X \ {x1, ..., xk−1} is xk. Hence, the same contract xk is chosen at
slot skb under both C
b and C
b
. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that C
b
satisfies the IRC condition. For any X ⊆ X such
that X 6= C
b
(X), let x be one of the rejected contracts, i.e., x ∈ X \C
b
(X). We need to show that
C
b
(X) = C
b
(X \ {x}).
Let xk and x˜k be the contracts chosen by the slot skb under C
b
from the set X and X \ {x},
respectively. We will show that xk = x˜k for each k = 1, ..., 2nb by induction. For the first slot s1b ,
since we know that xis not chosen by C
b
—and, hence by s1b— and Π
s1
b is a linear order we have
x1 = x˜1. Suppose that xj = x˜j for j = 1, ..., k − 1. We need to show that xk = x˜k. Notice that
the set of remaining contracts for slot skb from the choice processes starting with X and X \ {x}
are X \ {x1, ..., xk−1} and X \ {x, x1, ..., xk−1}, respectively. Since we know that x is not chosen,
and hence, is not Π
sk
b
b −maximal among the contracts X \ {x
1, ..., xk−1}, then we have xk = x˜k.
Therefore, at each slot, the same contract is chosen from the choice processes starting with X and
X \ {x}, respectively. This completes our proof.
Substitutability. Consider an offer set X ⊆ X such that X 6= C
b
(X). Let x be one of the
rejected contracts, i.e., x ∈ X \ C
b
(X), and let z be an arbitrary contract in X \ X. To show
substitutability, we need to show that
x /∈ C
b
(X ∪ {z}).
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: z /∈ C
b
(X ∪ {z}).
Since C satisfies the IRC condition, we have
C
b
(X) = C
b
(X ∪ {z}).
Since x /∈ C
b
(X) is given, we have x /∈ C
b
(X ∪ {z}), which is the desired conclusion.
Case 2: z ∈ C
b
(X ∪ {z}).
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We call the choice processes starting with the contract sets X and X ∪ {z}, respectively, as the
initial and new processes. Note that the precedence order ⊲b, the capacity transfer scheme qb, and
the priority profile of slots Πb are the same in the initial and new processes. Let Y i and Y
i
be the
sets of remaining contracts after slot sib, i = 1, ..., 2nb − 1, selects its contract in the initial and new
processes, respectively.
Let sjb be the slot that selects the contract z in the new process. For each slot i = 1, ..., j − 1,
we have Y
i
= Y i ∪ {z} as each slot sib, i = 1, ..., j − 1, selects the same contract under the initial
and new processes. Since slot sjb selects z, x is not chosen in any of s
1
b , ..., s
j
b in the new process. We
have the following possibilities:
1. sjb is an original seat with q
j
b = 0 and selects ∅ in the initial process.
2. sjb is an original seat with q
j
b = 1 and selects ∅ in the initial process.
3. sjb is an original seat and selects a different contract—call it y—in the initial process.
4. sjb is a shadow seat and selects ∅ in the initial process.
5. sjb is a shadow seat and selects a different contract—call it y—in the initial process.
In cases 1 and 4, Y j = Y
j
and the rest of the initial and the new process will be the same. Therefore,
for these cases we can conclude that x /∈ C (X ∪ {z}). In case 2, Y j = Y
j
and the associated shadow
seat of sjb is passive in the new process while it is active in the initial process. In cases 3 and 5,
Y j ∪ {y} = Y
j
. Note that in case 5, the associated shadow seat of sjb is passive as 1sj
b
= 1.
For every seat sκb , κ = j, ..., 2nb, we have either (i) Y
κ = Y
κ
and the capacity of sk+1b is either
the same in the initial and new processes or 1 in the initial process and 0 in the new process, or
(ii) Y κ ∪ {y} = Y
κ
, and the capacity of sk+1b is the same under both processes. We have already
showed it for κ = j above. By the way of induction, suppose that the assertion holds for slots
κ = j, ..., k − 1. We need to show that it holds for κ = k.
If Y k−1 = Y
k−1
and the capacity of the kth slot is 0 in both initial and new processes, then
we will have Y k = Y
k
, and the capacity of sk+1b will be the same under the initial and the new
processes. Similarly, if Y k−1 = Y
k−1
and the capacity of skb is 1 in both initial and new processes,
then the same contract will be chosen at skb . Hence, we will have Y
k = Y
k
, and the capacity of
sk+1b will be the same under the both processes.
Now suppose Y k−1 = Y
k−1
and the capacity of skb is 1 in the initial process and 0 in the new
processes. Note that skb must be a shadow seat in this case. If seat s
k
b selects ∅ in the initial process,
then we have Y k = Y
k
and the capacity of sk+1b is the same under both process. If seat s
k
b selects
contract y in the initial process, then we have Y k ∪ {y} = Y
k
. Moreover, the capacity of sk+1b is
the same under both processes.
Finally, suppose Y k−1∪{y} = Y
k−1
, and the capacity of skb is the same under the both processes.
If the capacity of skb is 0, then Y
k−1 ∪ {y} = Y
k−1
, and the capacity of sk+1b is the same under the
both processes. If the capacity of skb is 1 and Y
k−1∪{y} = Y
k−1
, either the same contract is chosen
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under both processes, or ∅ is chosen in the initial process and y is chosen in the new process. In
the former case, we have Y k ∪ {z} = Y
k
for some contract z and the capacity of sk+1b is the same
under both processes. In the latter case, Y k = Y
k
and the capacity of sk+1b is either the same under
both processes—in the cases, where skb is a shadow seat or is an original seat with q
k
b = 0—or the
capacity of sk+1b is 1 in the initial process and 0 in the new process—in the case where s
k
b is an
original slot with qkb = 1. This ends the proof of our claim.
Since x is not chosen by any seat in the initial process, it will not be chosen under the new
process either as a result of the above claim. Therefore, C
b
is substitutable.
Law of Aggregate Demand. Consider two sets of contracts X and Y such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ X .
We want to show that
| C
b
(X) |≤| C
b
(Y ) | .
We call the choice process starting with the contract set X as “process X”, and the choice process
starting with the contract set Y as “process Y”. Let Xj and Y j be the set of remaining contracts
after slot sjb selects its contract in processes X and Y, respectively, for j = 1, ..., 2nb. We will prove
that for each j = 1, ..., 2nb, Xj ⊆ Y j .
The first slot s1b is an original slot. Let x
1 be the contract chosen by s1b in process X. Since
X ⊂ Y , x1 ∈ Y . In process Y, s1b either selects x
1 or another contract y ∈ Y \X. In both cases, we
have X1 ⊆ Y 1. By the way of induction, suppose that Xj ⊆ Y j , for all j = 1, ..., k − 1. We need to
show Xk ⊆ Y k.
First suppose that skb is an original seat. Since X
k−1 ⊆ Y k−1, if skb chooses a contract x
k ∈
Xk−1 ⊆ Y k−1 in process X, then skb chooses either x
k or another contract z ∈ Y k−1 \Xk−1. In both
cases, Xk ⊆ Y k.
Now suppose that, skb is a shadow seat. Note that the capacity of the shadow seat in process
X is either the same as the capacity of this seat in process Y (both 0 or 1), or the capacity of skb
is 1 in process X and 0 in process Y—that is, the associated original seat is filled in process Y,
but remained vacant in process X. If they are both 0, then Xk−1 ⊆ Y k−1, and Xk−1 = Xk and
Y k−1 = Y k imply Xk ⊆ Y k. If they are both 1 and the contract xk is chosen by seat skb in process
X, then either contract xk or another contract w ∈ Y k−1 \Xk−1 is chosen in process Y. Both imply
Xk ⊆ Y k. Finally, suppose that skb is active in process X and passive in process Y. This is the case
only when the associated original seat is filled in process Y with a contract in Y \X and remains
vacant in process X. Given that Xk−1 ⊆ Y k−1, if a contract xk is chosen in process X, we have
Xk ⊆ Y k. It is important to note that it cannot be the case where the shadow seat skb is passive in
process X and active in process Y. It contradicts with the inductive assumption.
Since for all seats sjb, j = 1, ..., 2nb, we have X
j−1 ⊆ Y j−1, then we can conclude that C
b
(X) |≤|
C
b
(Y ) |.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume, toward a contradiction, that the COM with regard to SSPwCT
does not respect improvements. Then, there exists an agent i ∈ I, a preference profile of agents
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P ∈ ×i∈IP
i, and choice profiles C and C such that C is an improvement over C for agent i and
Ci(P ;C)P
iCi(P ;C).
Let Ci(P ;C) = x and Ci(P ;C) = x. Consider a preference P˜ i of agent i according to which the only
acceptable contract is x, i.e., P˜ i : x−∅i. Let P˜ = (P˜ i, P−i). We will first prove the following claim:
Claim: Ci(P˜ ;C) = x =⇒ Ci(P˜ ;C) = x.
Proof of the Claim: Consider the outcome of the COM under choice profile C given the prefer-
ence profile of agents P˜ . By Hirata and Kasuya (2014), the cumulative offer is order-independent.
We can first completely ignore agent i and run the COM until it stops. Let Y be the outcome. At
this point, agent i makes an offer for his only contract x. This might create a chain of rejections, but
it does not reach agent i since we assumed Ci(P˜ ;C) = x. Let the kth slot with respect to precedence
order ⊲b(x) be the slot that chose contract x.
Now consider the COM under choice profile C. Again, we completely ignore agent i and run
the COM until it stops. The same outcome Y is obtained, because the only difference between the
two COMs is agent i’s position in the priority rankings. At this point, agent i makes an offer for his
only contract x. If x is chosen by the same slot, i.e., kth slot with respect to ⊲b(x), then the same
rejection chain (if there was one in the COM under the choice profile C) will occur and it does not
reach agent i; otherwise, we would have a contradiction with the case under choice profile C. The
only other possibility is the following: since agent i’s ranking is now (weakly) better under Πb(x)
compared to Πb(x), his contract x might be chosen by slot l which precedes slot k with respect to
⊲b(x). Then, it must be the case that by selecting x slot l must reject some other contract it was
holding. Let us call this contract y. If no contract of agent i(y) = j is chosen between slots l and
k, then the slots between l and k choose the same contracts under both priority profiles. In this
case, y is chosen by slot k. Thus, if a rejection chain starts, it will not reach agent i; otherwise, we
could have a contradiction, due to the fact that x was chosen at the end of the COM under choice
profile C. A different contract of agent j cannot be chosen between groups l and k; otherwise, the
observable substitutability3 of branch b(x)’s SSPwCT choice rule would be violated. Therefore, if
any contract of agent j is chosen by slots between l and k, it must be y. If y is chosen by a slot
that precedes k, then it must replace a contract—we call this contract z. By the same reasoning, no
other contract of agent i(z) can be chosen before slot k; otherwise, we would violate the observable
substitutability of branch b(x)’s SSPwCT choice rule. Proceeding in this fashion causes the same
contract in slot k to be rejected and initiates the same rejection chain that occurs under choice
profile C. Since the same rejection chain does not reach agent i under choice profile C, it will not
reach agent i under choice profile C, which ends our proof for the claim.
3By Hatfield, Kominers and Westkamp (2019), we know that any choice function that has a substitutable and
size monotonic completion must be observably substitutable. Observable substitutability simply says that branch
choices along the cumulative offer process satisfy substitutes property, i.e., for the offer sets that can arise during the
cumulative offer process.
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Since Ci(P ;C) = x and Ci(P ;C) = x such that xP ix, if agent i misreports and submits P˜ i under
choice profile C , then she can successfully manipulate the COM. This is a contradiction as we have
already established that the COM is strategy-proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that Z is the outcome of the COM at (P,C), where P =
(Pi1 , ..., Pin ) is the profile of agent preferences and C = (C
b1 , ..., Cbm) is the profile of branches’
SSPwCT choice rules. Consider a branch b ∈ B. Suppose that C˜b and Cb take as an input capacity
transfer schemes q˜b and qb, respectively, where q˜kb = q
k
b for all k = 1, ..., s − 1, s + 1, ..., nb. For slot
s, let q˜sb = 1 and q
s
b = 0. That is, the capacity of the original seat s is transferred to the associated
shadow seat under capacity function q˜b, but not under the capacity function qb. We need to prove
that the outcome of the COM at (P, (C˜b, C−b)), Z˜, Pareto dominates Z.
In the computation of COM, if the original slot s is filled, then we have Z˜ = Z because, under
both q˜b and qb the shadow slot associated with the original slot s will become inactive.
We now consider the case where the original slot s remains vacant in the computation of COM
under (P,C). Then, under (P, (C˜b, C−b)), the shadow slot associated with the original slot s – we
call it s˜ – will be active, i.e., it will have a capacity of 1. There are two cases to consider. If the
shadow slot s˜ remains vacant in the computation of COM under (P, (C˜b, C−b)), then we again have
Z˜ = Z , as the only difference between the two COMs, under (P,C) and (P, (C˜b, C−b)), is the
capacity of the shadow slot s˜.
The non-trivial case is the one where the shadow slot s˜ is assigned a contract in COM under
(P, (C˜b, C−b)). We now define an improvements chain algorithm that starts with the outcome Z.
Step 1. Let x1 be the contract that is assigned to slot s˜ in the SSPwCT choice procedure of
branch b(x1). If agent i(x1) is assigned ∅ under Z, then the improvement process ends and we have
Z˜ = Z ∪ {x1}. Otherwise, set as z1 the contract that agent i(x1) is assigned under Z. Note that
x1Pi(x1)z1.
Step 2. Let x2 be the contract that is chosen by the slot vacated by z1 (or the shadow seat that
is associated with it). If agent i(x2) is assigned ∅ under Z, then the improvement process ends and
we have Z˜ = Z∪{x1, x2}\{z1}. Otherwise, set as z2 the contract that agent i(x2) is assigned under
Z. Note that x2Pi(x2)z2.
Step n. Let xn be the contract that is chosen by the slot vacated by zn−1 (or the shadow seat
that is associated with it). If agent i(xn) is assigned ∅ under Z, then the improvement process ends
and we have Z˜ = Z ∪{x1, ..., xn} \ {z1, ..., zn−1}. Otherwise, set as zn the contract that agent i(xn)
is assigned under Z. Note that xnPi(xn)zn.
In every step of the improvement chain algorithm a contract is replaced by a more preferred con-
tract. Since there are finitely many contracts the improvement chain algorithm must end. Therefore,
we reach Z˜, which Pareto dominates Z, in finitely many step. This ends our proof.
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